Shipbucket

Thank you, Bombhead for your very informative addendum to my reply on PB:s comment. Like you say: caution was the preferred method of tactical deployment in the face of those novel threats that the destroyer (torpedo) and u-boat (torpedo also) as well as mines represented!

as for other versions, yes, I'm planning on doing, at least the QE herself as commissioned at the Dardanelles, possibly her as Grand Fleet flagship. If there are any particular wishes, I'm ready to consider it, with the agreement of my esteemed collegue Hood, of course!

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My Avatar:Петр Алексеевич Безобразов (Petr Alekseevich Bezobrazov), Вице-адмирал , царская ВМФ России(1845-1906) - I sign my drawings as Ari Saarinen

Sounds good to me.

HMS Warspite please Jutland and 1936? refit.

Finally someone does the QE's!

I read that the design was so good that Greece wanted to purchase the Valiant from the British (who flatly refused, but offered to build a sister). Of course, Greece also considered purchasing a copy of the battlecruiser Kongo, so it's difficult to know how seriously they considered this offer.

Of interesting note, Brazil considered ordering a "super" Queen Elizabeth with ten 15-Inch guns...

Displacement: 32,500-Tons
Dimensions: 689ft oa x 96ft x 28ft 6in normal (210.0m x 29.3m x 8.7m)
Machinery: 4-shaft Parsons geared turbines, Yarrow boilers (Oil Burning), 45,000shp = 24kts
Armor: Krupp steel. Belt 13in (330mm).
Armament: 10 x 15-Inch/45cal (5x2), 20-6in (152mm)/50cal, 10-3in, 4-3in AA, 6 TT sub
Complement: 1200

One wonders what would've happened had the RN had built some of these instead of the Revenge or Admiral-classes.

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Fan of Dreadnaughts, Super-Dreadnaughts, Fast Battleships and Battlecruisers.

Since people like the story lines so much, I updated and corrected the info given.
As for ships, yes, I might as well go ahead and do the entire 5th BS as of Jutland...why not?!?

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My Avatar:Петр Алексеевич Безобразов (Petr Alekseevich Bezobrazov), Вице-адмирал , царская ВМФ России(1845-1906) - I sign my drawings as Ari Saarinen

I find it interesting that the RN Queen Elizabeths (and the
R Class, for that matter) were not modernized to be exactly
the same. The USN South Dakota class were each given a
different AA refit in 1943. Since Navies are large organizations
run by a few senior people at the top, one would think that
refits and modernizations would all conform to one plan
approved by a small committee or the Senior Staff. Part of
the attraction of the Queen Elizabeths for me is that they
all started out the same and ended up being very distinct
from one another.

Will you draw the Warspite soon?

Just a response to Bezo's reply to my earlier posting:

Well, Bezo, maybe I also understand your mindset, but what that assumption is clearly ignoring is.....

It is funny though, how after nearly a century of the most intense debate we two 'armchair admirals' can finally arrive at the true causes for the failure of the Grand Fleet to decisively eliminate the High Seas Fleet. But what the hell, I've just read a book, and I'm away from home, so here goes...
Right? Are we here refering to:

"The Business of the English commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself, (I mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible); and secondly to continue them there until the business is decided"

Well, that depends on how we interpret what is actually being said here. Certainly, the first part makes perfect sense, but if you are inferring that I was advocating that Jellicoe and his ships actually operate in the exact same manner as with Nelson's tactics of heading staright into the enemy to engage at close quarters, even boarding, then I fear you mistake me for a poltron. The point I was actually making is that during the long peace, after the Napoleonic wars, and Gt Britains emergence as the preminent power, the application of initiative and training in the tactics and use of warships was largely ignored. True, Nelson was held up as an ideal, but not many naval officers were inclined or encouraged to develop new ways of fighting.

Certainly, the loss of the Victoria in 1893 was a terrible tragedy, and with the loss of Sir George Tryon, iniative in signalling lapsed; but the actual circumstances of the collision with the Camperdown perfectly illustrated just how badly the rot had set in, with Captain Markham prefering to follow an order that he knew would end in disaster, rather than follow common sense and disobey; and the same scene was being played out on the bridge of the Victoria, with officers standing around Tryon, knowing that his orders were impossible to obey without a collision, yet none being able to inform him. Significantly, Jellicoe was a survivor from the Victoria.

Obviously, there were many factors that contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome of Jutland, at least from the British perspective. Certainly Von Scheer was trying to lure Beattie's force onto the teeth of his main fleet using Hipper's force as the bait. Notwithstanding the better build of German battlecruisers, otherwise, the German fleet was not in a superior position to comprehensively defeat Jellicoe's entire fleet, and Von Scheer knew this; he even had some fairly antiquated pre dreadnoughts in his fleet, which were a liability. I'm adopting the assumption that the best he could hope for would be a 'win' in as much as a part of the british fleet would be destroyed. But (as we all know) the British knew (finally) what he was about, having intecepted his signals and being able to read the German code; so, in effect, Beattie was intending to turn the tables and lure the Germans back onto Jellicoe's main force.

One of the notable failures on the British side was in signalling; even, if we allow the stretch, the criminal ignoring of the early intelligence that told them that the High Seas Fleet was at sea. And yes, Beattie was very remiss in not properly signalling to Evan Thomas the turn he was making, putting too far a distance between his Battlecruisers and the four 'Queens', so leaving the Battlecruisers exposed too long before the Queens could come up in support. Again, where was Nelson's example? When Evan Thomas came down to Rosyth and moored close to Beattie, he was never invited aboard, as not being part of his 'set', he was a Jellico man. Even allowing for the vast diferences between the ships in Nelson's day to those at Jutland, the simple fact was that there was poor communication and a lack of initiative always at play, and before we go further, the German fleet suffered just as much from rigid control.

The mention of Jellicoe's delay in pressing his advantage due to a fear of a torpedo attack is also significant. There is a strong opinion in more recent analysis that this was the wrong decision, as the risk was not sufficient to deter the advantage, and by implication, an admiral of Nelson's mind-set would have taken the risk, and got Sheer's fleet where he wanted him. A modern example could be 'Sandy' Woodward, who was apparently quoted as saying: "fuck the rule book, we are going to fight this my way". In actual fact Scheer got lucky, he was able to execute a well-rehearsed about turn to flee the British fleet, and also managed to get pass the British during the night to safety. If he had been (as should have happened) trapped between his base and the British, the outcome would have been a comprehensive annihilation of his fleet. That would have been catastrophic to Geramn moral, and quite possibly have gretaly shortened the war. as it happened it did niot make the final outcome any different. The Royal Navy continued its blockade of Germany, craeting mass starvation, it was able keep the channel open continuoulsy for the support of its army; it also allowed the movement of millions of US servicemen across the atlantic, in alliance with the USN. Even the belated switch to total u-boat warfare did not to prevent ultimate victory.

Sorry, got to go LP is on the warpath, and threatening me with unrestricted ear bashing

bezobrazov has my permission to do as many of these excellent works as he wishes, with the sole caveat that they all look this good!

The Jutland analysis has many sides and arguements. Perhaps it all boils down to this; the British had far more to lose from defeat than they would have gained from victory and the Germans would have gained far less than the British from victory. Thus it was vital for the Royal Navy to win, everyone expected them to win, the pressure was too much and they baulked it. The High Seas Fleet had nothing to loose, they would still be outnumbered and bottled up in harbour if they destroyed Beatty's force or not.

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Hood's Worklist
English Electric Canberra FD
Interwar RN Capital Ships
Super-Darings
Never-Were British Aircraft

I thank Hood for his generosity. What I'm doing, in fact, is re-studying the individual ships so I can, indeed do my very best to lend Hood's superb drawing fair justice in its different guides. I wasn't aware that this class is so popular, but little wonder, considering its sterling collective service record and unparalleled individual ditto!

As for the various arguments presented, I believe they could be amalgamated into one thesis, since I never figured PB to be a wholly irresponsible Armchair admiral'. My point on the so-called "Nelson touch" is that in modern naval warfare it is at best a very difficult maxim to apply, at worst a recipe for impending disaster. The mentioning of Adm. Woodward, in fact, strengthens that viewpoint, if one considers the losses the British Expeditionary Force actually suffered: 2 Type42s, 2Type 21s and half a dozen other vessels damaged. The Argentinians lost one obsolete cruiser and two subs. It is true that, due to a faulty tactical thinking on the part of Vice Admiral Jorge Anaya, the fleet was kept in port fir the reminder of the conflict, but the losses sustained by the RN were reaching a breaking point. I have, in fact, no sure answer what might have happened had the principal British commanders at Jutland exercised more caution and less vigor in attacking, but I'm convinced the losses might have been reduced.

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My Avatar:Петр Алексеевич Безобразов (Petr Alekseevich Bezobrazov), Вице-адмирал , царская ВМФ России(1845-1906) - I sign my drawings as Ari Saarinen