PLOT TWIST:
The Republic of Chile sells Rapa Nui (Easter Island) in exchange for naval units, 1930.
Historically, Chile has sought to sell off its Easter Island possession twice, in 1926 to Great Britain and 1937 to the highest bidder, in order to finance the acquisition of new cruisers for its fleet. The Chilean navy endured a grave lack of modern cruisers for many decades due to this type being omitted from the “Centenary Plan” of 1910, due to believing the ships in service to be adequate, since they were similar to the ones in Argentinean service. The matter became urgent when in 1929 the ALMIRANTE BROWN-class cruisers were launched, and the balance of power became completely lopsided when LA ARGENTINA entered service in 1939. Neither time saw an agreement being reached, and in the end the financial solution came through the so called "Cruiser Law" of 1938.
In the meantime, the government of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who had been ruling since 1927, fell, then the Navy mutinied in 1931 due to successive 10% and 30% cuts to their salaries by the succeeding government of Juan Esteban Montero, which was ousted by the coup organized by the Air Force CinC Marmaduke Grove, which installed the short lived Socialist Republic of Chile, which ended in the expulsion of Grove and Eugenio Matte by another member of their government, Carlos Dávila, which was himself ousted by a countercoup led by general Bartolomé Blanche, who had to step down after revolts by several garrisons, which ended in the president of the supreme court, Abraham Oyandel, taking charge and calling for elections, in which Arturo Alessandri, who had been ousted by Ibáñez in the first place, won. Thus ended the “Anarchy Period” but not Chile’s economic woes.
ANYWAYS…
For this scenario, Ibáñez does a number of things differently, including blocking the introduction of the Gold Standard to the monetary system, forming the Chilean Saltpetre Company (COSACH) without taking the burden of the private mining companies’ debts, and pre-emptively solving most of the problems the Navy had by selling Easter Island in order to finance the required cruisers and the servicemen’s salaries for a few years.
So in 1930, the post is up, Chile’s selling Easter Island and as much nitrate as you can carry with you to anyone who’ll build cruisers and give some hard currency to them. The sale’s only even remotely attractive to powers interested in the Pacific ocean. The USA has a network of bases from Pearl Harbor to Manila to Samoa and they don’t need the mediocre anchorage at Rapa Nui. Neither does Great Britain, who’s more interested in developing Fanning, Penrhyn and Suvarov islands as fuelling bases. France has plenty of possessions in the southern Pacific as well.
This leaves Japan.
Rapa Nui would, at the very least, give the IJN a secure place for Submarines, Flying Boats and their tenders to rendezvous deep into the eastern Pacific, and a base within sortieing distance of the Galapagos, which are themselves within strike distance of the Panama Canal, opening a whole new flank against the USN and potentially unleashing recon assets and commerce raiders amidst the Canal’s western entrance.
Eager as Japan is, their economic situation is also heavily punished by the ongoing Great Depression, so a long term deal is struck. The Empire of Japan will build 5 vessels for Chile, a “Battlecruiser”, two Light Cruisers/Flotilla Leaders and two Cruiser Submarines, all of them to be equipped with British weaponry, in order to maintain commonality with the rest of the Chilean fleet. Besides this, Japan will give Chile regular payments amounting to 4 million pounds over the span of 5 years. In exchange, Chile will cede the territory of Easter Island, its sovereignty and economic rights to the land and its surrounding waters, to the Empire of Japan, along with 10 million tons of sodium and potassium nitrates (about 2/3rds of Chile’s overall production throughout the period), 4 million tons of iodine and 2 million tons of copper ingots, across the same 5 years.
This would serve to stimulate both countries’ economies for a while, as Japan’s private shipyards had been having less and less contracts given to them through the years, culminating in the London Naval Treaty threatening to shut them off completely from warship building as overall tonnage limits for all types of warships were being discussed. Meanwhile, this subsidized mineral production would help to placate the collapse of the nitrate offices and hold off the mass migration of nitrate workers from the north to the central provinces of Chile.
An agreement is reached in March 1930. Both the USA and Great Britain immediately send notes of protest. Chile replies that if they’re not willing to give them either cruisers or cash, they can keep sending notes as long as they want. The Hoover government threatens with invoking the Monroe Doctrine. Press and experts around the world point out that Easter Island lies in Oceania, not America. The MacDonald government points out that the Empire of Japan is still banned from fortifying the island according to the commitments to the Four Power Treaty. Japan takes note and carries on with their business. The keel for the battlecruiser is laid down at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki shipyard on 7 September 1930.
THE BATTLECRUISER: ALMIRANTE COCHRANE
As has been discussed previously, Chile had ordered a Battleship by the name ALMIRANTE COCHRANE which ended up requisitioned by the Royal Navy and converted to an Aircraft Carrier, which the Chilean government refused to buy at a later date. This still left the Chilean fleet in a comparably favourable situation, as the Battleship acquired, ALMIRANTE LATORRE was armoured to resist the 12” gunfire from the Argentinean and Brazilian Dreadnoughts, and her own 14” weaponry could easily pierce her opponents’ protection. Brazil and Argentina’s failure to acquire more modern ships meant that LATORRE would still command any engagement, but of course a single ship can only stay so long at sea before needing resupplying and refit. This situation was made worse with the appearance of the ALMIRANTE BROWN-class, both of those cruisers could divide LATORRE’s fire and punish her if she was engaging the RIVADAVIA-class Battleships.
At this point, Chile could not afford a new Battleship of the quality that the Japanese shipyards could deliver, nor could the scouting and screening needs of the navy be ignored any longer. For this, Japan offered Chile a number of possible combinations of ships within the agreed budget, including two 10-gun, 10,000 t (on paper) Cruisers similar to the latest entering service with the IJN, but the desire to be able to engage the rival Battleships meant that Chile would favour a ship with capital-grade weapons.
The design finally chosen was a ship of 20,000 t standard, armed with six 14” guns, armoured to resist 14” gunfire at combat ranges, and with a design speed of 31 kn. Range was to be 8,000 nautical miles at 15 kn. Welding was to be used where appropriate and the armour was to be part of the structure in order to reduce both cost and weight as much as possible.
The main armament was set at only six 14” guns because the rifles intended for the rebuilt COCHRANE, now HMS EAGLE were available, and this was preferred over ordering new 12” high performance guns or using older ones. This battery was directed by a Type 94 rangefinder and Type 94 director combination, with one director fore and aft, covered by 25 mm splinter protection, a rangefinder in a protected hood atop the main tower, and another emergency rangefinder inside an unarmoured “battle gazebo” aft. The secondary armament went through several iterations, including 5.5” single-purpose guns of both Japanese and British origin and 5” Type 89 guns before settling on the Vickers-Armstrong 4.7”/45 Mark G dual-purpose gun, which was the Mark F with its chamber modified to use the separate ammunition used by the Vickers Mark E in use by the Chilean Navy. The battery of six twin guns was directed by a quartet of Type 94 high angle directors. The anti-aircraft armament was rounded up by two octuple 2-pdr QF Mark VIII pom-poms directed by four Type 95 machine gun directors. Lastly, six 21” torpedo tubes in two side-rotating mounts were shipped, firing the British Mark VII torpedo.
Aviation facilities were extensive to fulfil the long-range reconnaissance rôle, with a hangar for two aircraft and two catapults. Four aircraft could be carried but no more than three Fairey IIIF were ever shipped.
The ship was launched on 30 April 1932, christened by Hon. Katherine Elizabeth Cochrane, Countess of Elgin and Kincardine, great granddaughter of Thomas Cochrane, in a ceremony attended by IJN officers, Imperial diplomats, Japanese industrialists, a Chilean naval and diplomatic delegation and also a British diplomatic delegation led by the British ambassador to Japan. Speeches were read, drink and food served, congratulations given back and forth. Shinto priests from the Gokoku shrine sprinkled water from mount Sendai, praying that when the ship came back to her homeland she would come back in peace.
Looking closely at the new ship, one may notice that she was not, indeed, a proper capital ship, and her design owed more to the YŪBARI lineage of cruisers than to any Battleship design school of thought. Her overall layout was reminiscent of her ancestors, with boiler and machinery rooms grouped together to economize size and weight rather than a unit arrangement favouring survivability. Her Cb of 0.556 was also decidedly un-battleship-like. The bridge rose over the fore boiler rooms, and a modest conning tower with 250 mm (10”) sides and 180 mm (7.1”) roof connected by a 200 mm (7.9”) communications tube to the citadel was a brief nod to her classification. The W/T room which contained the Shagekiban fire control system was inconveniently placed in the middle of the citadel, between the boiler and engine rooms and next to the 4.7” magazines. Her protection, while well laid out, was not particularly strong, with a 250 mm (10”) belt inclined 12°, 4.25 m (14 ft) tall and 108 m (354 ft) long, reduced to 230 mm (9”) over boiler and machinery rooms. The belt thinned down to 75 mm (3”) at the bottom and was topped out by a 140 mm (5.5”) deck over magazines, which inclined 2.5° on the sides to meet the belt, 110 mm (4.3”) over boilers and machinery rooms plus a 25 mm (1”) burster deck here. The turrets were protected by 360 mm (14”) faces, 280 mm (11”) sides, 200 mm (7.9”) rears and 180 mm (7.1”) roofs. The barbettes had 250 mm (10”) thick armour all around. Bulkheads finished off the citadel, 230 mm (9”) fore and 200 mm (7.9”) aft. Finally, a modest torpedo defence system was fitted, with no visible bulges but oil bunkers next to the hull plating, a small void space and 40 mm (1.6”) bulkheads inside. It was judged sufficient to stop 18” torpedoes, but of doubtful use against larger warheads. A rather cramped triple bottom ran 108 m (354 ft) below the citadel, turning into a double bottom fore and aft of this, another nod to her intended position in the fleet. A box with 140 mm (5.5”) sides and a 75 mm (3”) roof covered the steering gear.
Her power plant consisted of seven oil-fired Kampon boilers in three boiler rooms for 110,000 shp as designed, feeding four turbine sets which consisted of a high pressure and a low pressure turbine each, plus a cruising turbine on the outer sets, for a total of four shafts.
As completed, COCHRANE came out at 21,500 t standard, some 7% overweight. This is noticeably less than her cousins in the IJN and can be attributed to her being designed and built to a budget instead of to treaty limitations. On trials, she was measured at 112,700 shp for 31.92 kn, earning Kawasaki a small bonus. This was of course achieved in light condition and without her 4.7” and 2-pdr guns shipped, that would be done in Great Britain after her commissioning.
The Chilean ensign was raised on 7 September of 1933 and she departed Nagasaki two days later, bound first to Singapore on a goodwill visit as relations between Great Britain and Chile had warmed again. Not so with the United States, which viewed the ship with anxiety ever since her specifications were known, as it was feared she would become part of the IJN before commissioning. Even after departing Japan, the USN paid attention to her performance and movements, since they considered her a significant risk if she were ever deployed as a commerce raider against US shipping. Indeed, the USN had no assets capable of both outrunning her and outfighting her at the same time, and she posed a veritable rival to any of the 14” gun standard Battleships on a one-on-one fight.
During her long voyage she called at Singapore, Aden, Athens, Naples, Toulon and Ferrol before docking at Barrow-in-Furness for the fitting of her anti-aircraft armament and minor components. After five weeks, she set sail again, calling at Rio de Janeiro, where she was received with a small ceremony in which SÃO PAULO was present. She then rounded Cape Horn and arrived at Valparaiso on 12 February of 1934 to a joyful crowd and a dressed overall fleet.
Here's a little armour scheme diagram, hope it's intelligible:
STATISTICS FOR NERDS:
Displacement:
19,890 t light
21,510 t standard
24,340 t full load
Dimensions:
L: 187.9 m (616 ½ ft)
B: 26 m (85 ¼ ft)
D: 7.85 m (25 ¾ ft) normal
Propulsion:
4 shafts, 4 turbine sets, 7 Kampon boilers, 112,700 shp total, 31.9 kn
Range:
8,000 nmi @ 15 kn
Complement: 1,076 officers and enlisted.
Armament:
3xII 14"/45 Mark I
6xII 4.7”/45 Mark G
2x 2-pdr QF Mark VIII octuple pom-poms
2xIII 21” torpedo tubes, Mark VII torpedoes
Armour:
Belt: 250 mm (10”) over magazines, 230 mm (9”) over machinery.
Deck: 140 mm (5.5”)
Bulkheads: 230 mm (9”) fore, 200 mm (7.9”) aft.
Turrets: 360 mm (14”) - 280 mm (11”) - 180 mm (7.1”)
Barbettes: 250 mm (10”)
CT: 250 mm (10”)
The accompanying submarines have been posted here:
http://shipbucket.com/forums/viewtopic. ... 30#p176041 but I will post them again, along with the complete fluff, once I'm done with the Light Cruisers.
As always I hope you enjoy this and any comments and criticism are very welcome.