Finnish AU (Part III)

The 1949 Naval Program

Part I Introduction

After the hostilities halted, the navy was mostly embarked on the huge minesweeping task of clearing the over 60 000 sea mines laid in the Finnish waters and onto its proximity during the war.
This kept all available naval vessels aside the submarines and armored ships in the minesweeping flotillas, and the whole work lasted until 1948. Several civilian vessels were added to the fleet and Novgorod provided the Finnish share of war reparations from Ex-Kriegsmarine stocks, bulk of them being minesweepers and transport crafts. These transfers also included American build vessels that Novgorod had received from the Lend Lease. (During the war, Finland received its share of the Lend Lease, but it didn’t consist of any warships, as those would have been impossible to transfer into Baltics. )
Actual naval production continued postwar in mainly supplementing the motor minesweeper series and completing the motor torpedo boat programs. Despite the fleet was put on peace time gearing as much as possible, the naval planners took quite active role in the following years to determine the future of the Fleet under the wartime lessons and against future threats.

Biggest change in naval doctrine came in the abandonment of the old “Heavy Coastal Defence Fleet”, or the armored ships as the bulk of the Fleet’s strength. Despite their swansong performance in the Battle of Kökar during the war, the main conclusion was that the design was obsolete even at the start of the war, as slow vessels they were poorly capable of retaliating into rapidly changing situations outside their immediate deployment zones. Also as the invasion of the Åland in 1941 showed, at the presence of enemy Battleships, that will to use the precious and expensive ships in desperate defense missions was minimal.
Lots of this criticism spurred from the mentioned humiliation in failing to prevent the landings in Åland – the main task assisted to the navy pre-war, by the armored ship concentrated fleet. Partially this was because of the general inexperience of the war time leadership and badly miscalculated tactical positions prior to the fighting, but the usefulness of the armored ship was nevertheless declared limited. Other observations of the wartime fleet saw the lack of concentrated use of its strengths, Submarines, and motor torpedo boats, mostly attributed to the small numbers and lack of seaborne support in terms of modern and capable tenders. Also, MTB operations in daytime were deemed dangerous without them working on concert together with gunboats and destroyers, of which the later was judged to be too small and too lightly armed to stand against similar size enemy units. Most handful vessels proved to be the old sloops and the Ruotsinsalmi class minelayers, as they were good in various escort and patrol duties as well as supporting the small boats and launches in the island fighting during the war.

The new doctrine emerging from these studies was focusing on the fact that the biggest defensive asset Finns possessed was the extensively rugged archipelago in the southern coast, that provided excellent support area for the fleet. During the wartime, the fleet was able to disperse its units so effectively that the enemy, despite strong air-superiority was never able to use its airpower to dismantle Finnish naval formations as operational units and deny their operations. Most losses from air came from open sea escort duty in the Leningrad front.
The main goal of the new fleet was to use this archipelago as its support zone and deny the enemy entrance into it, and to drag the battle into area itself. From these support areas the Finnish fleet was to conduct classical Juene École type of sea denial operations in Northern Baltic and prevent or harrass enemy landing forces. Short distances in the operational theater made it possible to focus on maximum tactical speed of the general forces, that would provide both quick response time as this maximum speed could be used in transitioning into the area of operations, as well as form the bulk of the movement of the dash attacks against enemy ships.

The new Fleet was structured around motor torpedo boats, which would form the backbone of the offensive assets operating in the Archipelago Sea as well as in the Gulf of Botnia and in the eastern Gulf of Finland. They would be led by powerful (in Finnish standards) destroyers and their task was to break down enemy advancements into key areas. Extensive mine laying and coastal artillery would provide the static element of this concept that would force enemy seek their movement in predictable directions. MTBs and Destroyers were seen more flexible in the response and as fast units their tactical maneuverability was seen as the key feature for the unit survival, as the wartime experiences had shown slower vessels being able to absorb huge amount of damage and still retain vital combat capability, at least after quick repairs.

Submarines were intended to operate in the open sea, outside the immediate defensive barriers and obstruct enemy support transports and harass coastal traffic, which would then tie down enemy units into frustrating ASW task forces and convoy escorts. Submarines purposefulness against enemy combat units was seen low and too risky as the wartime results in this type of warfare were few and poor, and the submarine technology of that day was deemed handicapped against modern ASW methods possessed by the combat units.

Another important aspect was the division of the fleet into General forces and into Local Forces, of which the Offensive units would form the General Forces, which would be used in focused areas in concentrated means. Local Forces would consist minesweepers, escort- and patrol vessels, and they would be distributed along the coast line and their purpose was to provide constant defenses of their area of operation and halt the enemy advancement until the General Forces would be deployed there. A special Archipelago Fighting unit was to be formed in the Archipelago Sea, and it would consist of specialized gunboats, armored patrol boats, gun- and transport ferries as well as the actual marine units in form of the Coastal Jaegers. It would oppose the actual enemy landings and engage in recapturing islands and coastal sites. Coastal artillery was given the main “fleet in being” role, and it was planned to cover the entire coast From Tornio to Terijoki with strong fortifications and rabidly deployable mobile units, which together with the Local Forces would cover the permanent presence of coastal defenses, allowing the General Forces to be used in concentration in the most pressing directions. This was deemed necessary to allow sufficient size combat formations to be formed.

Finally, the aircrafts were seemed crucial element in future warfare in sea, and creation of separate Air regiments under Navy’s control was to be part of the new naval program. This would ensure that the Navy would always have air assets available to it, outside from the inter fraction rivalry inside the armed forces, that hampered the joint naval and air operations during the wartime.

All together the Finnish naval envisionist saw their work rather homegrown and domestic perspective, outside the foreign influences, as Novgorodian naval planners were all entangled in large ocean going fleet designs to counter the massive NATO fleets in open seas. Novgorodian light units were seen as too purpose-build special vessels, that were unsuited for needs and capabilities of small coastal fleet. Maintaining domestic shipbuilding industry was felt important in the high political decision making and domestic warship production, especially if it delivered highly specialized vessels were seen as vanguard of the entire industry. Finnish fleet planners did not saw much capability and possibilities for the Fleet to operate outside its own coastal waters and outside defending Finnish own interests. It was rightfully calculated, that the sparse resources should not be wasted on focusing defending the Arctic port in Petsamo outside land based fortifications and policing work. The Novgorodian Northern Fleet begun its enormous growth at the end of the WWII, and its close proximity was deemed sufficient in the area, where infrastructure didn’t allow same level exercising of national sovereignty as it did on the Baltic.
It was also noteworthy that the Finnish planners did not hold lot fate in Novgorod’s ability to retain its naval superiority in the Baltic, and calculated that during the next war, the frontlines would be same as in the last, which was the direct opposite of the Novgorodian post war military strategy. It took more than a decade before the Finnish naval doctrine begun place merit for a joint Warsaw Pact naval strategy of aggressive forward deployment of its forces into Denmark Straits.

As Germany was no longer a threat, the main enemy was seen as Sweden and other Scandinavian nations that were quickly re-allying themselves with US led NATO. Denmark and Norway joined NATO at its formation and Sweden retained close ties to the west and followed the suite in 1955 together with the Federal Republic of Germany. Finnish naval planners did not poses acute information over the vast capacities of Americans and how much they would or could allocate in the Baltic’s, but the general trend was seen that Americans were masters of amphibious warfare, thus making the landing thread even more immediate than it was with Germany in previous decades.

These thesis became the backbone of the 1949 Naval Program, that was to be concluded in 10 years. It called total of 28,000 ton fleet consisting 3 Destroyers, 10 Coastal submarines and large number of coastal crafts, as well as the restructuring the navy into its new formations mentioned above.
Most of the units build for the Grand Duchy’s navy were finally discarded and scrapped, and the most modern forces, the large minelayer Kansanvalta, the Destroyers and the fast gunboats were all modernized. Only Väinämöinen and Lemminkäinen of the armored ships were retained, mostly as training and prestige vessels, and they were usually commissioned in turns per sailing season. Most of the wartime submarines were seen as unsuited for modernization for modern snorkels and silencing methods which revolutionarisized underwater warfare.

As the cold war begun, the last remaining foreign links to European naval powers were lost and Finnish navy became solely reliant of Novgorodian help in regarding access to new technologies. Finnish naval tradition was at its height during the postwar years and the great investments for shipbuilding capacity and design base quickly rewarded the fleet and all ships authorized in the 1949 naval program were build in domestic yards. The prewar ties to German-Dutch submarine design firms were cut out during the war and therefore the first new Ahti Class submarines contained mostly Novgorodian transferred information from captured German technologies. Most of the ordnance shipped by the naval units were either Novgorodian origin or build in license in Finnish factories. Wärtsilä brand of naval diesel engines from Valmet production begun to be fielded in Finnish build warships and due the course of the following decades, the Finnish naval motor industry grew substantially, allowing Finnish navy lot more freedom in ship design progress.

The 1949 Naval program begun its fulfillment when the three Destroyers and first two of the new submarines were laid down in 1950 and completed in the following years. At first, its MTB component consisted of revisiting of the wartime Taisto class boats, but small petrol-engined and floatplane hulled Italian boats were soon found ineffective against the German type larger diesel engine and boat hulled vessels. Similar crafts begun to form mainstay in northern European NATO Fleets. A new diesel engined Nuoli class boats were developed from Novgorodian and Soviet examples and provided a basis for a 70 ton class that was build in almost 30 examples during the following 10 years in both Motor torpedo boat as well as motor gunboat versions in two batches that different each others in detail. They provided the bulk of the Finnish fast attack units for the following decades to come.

As the minesweeper capacities were adequately provided by the postwar acquisitions, the 1949 program foresaw only small 90 ton motor-minesweepers of the R-class to join the fleet. The wartime build Metallityöläinen class fast 400-ton gunboats were deemed well suited as coastal escorts, which were to be the mainstay of the Local Forces, and the design was repeated in improved 500-ton Pioneeri Class escorts. In later years of their career, they were mostly fielded as submarine hunters, as the doctrine of providing strong local escorts for supporting shipping in Finnish-Novgorodian sea trade was seen almost as an insult from Novgorodian Baltic Fleets point of view.

Finally the peculiar Archipelago Battle Group was formed from captured German artillery lighters and new domestic produced 450 ton gunboats, with swallow draught that resembled classic riverine gunboats. These were armed with 120mm guns and used to support the Coastal Jaegers of recapturing islands and participate in the local defenses of the archipelago and support the strong coastal artillery. Special armored patrol crafts were also build with 85mm tank turrets to support these operations, but the mainstay of the Battle Group was to be small lighters or pontoon ferries modeled after German design, that were to be easily converted into landing crafts, transports, artillery lighters or mine ferries. These Kala class crafts were build in huge numbers, for a total time spur of 20 years from 1950, before being replaced in production lines by more modern and sophisticated designs. They provided the backbone of the Fleet and coastal Artillery’s coastal transport capacity and multipurpose platforms for the Local Defence Forces. Smaller and single hulled Kave class supplemented them and they were built for more traditional LCVP design. Together with the formation of the Coastal Jaegers as independent branch in land forces and later completely subordinated to Naval Command, this Archipelago Battle Group provide the nucleus to the Finnish Marine Corps and amphibious assault fleet that was to come.

The 1949 Naval program provided the basis for the Finnish People’s Navy for the following decades to come and in its organizational concept remains the backbone of the Navy even today. Despite the Finnish Navy did not materialize significantly larger than its prewar strength in comparison for other Baltic navies, the Political will to maintain Independent and domestic Naval power in Finnish hand was important decision that allowed Finnish fleet develop in its own unique ways compared to those of Poland and DDR during the Cold war. Naturally this was aided by the fact that Finnish Communist Rule was starting its fourth decade and second generation and Finland was part of the Victorious allies, not rehabilated former enemies that had to create their new fleets and armed forces from scratch. Despite Finnish Naval strength was but a fraction of Novgorod Baltic Fleet, it often enjoyed almost equal status in the decision making when it came to conducting the joint maritime defenses of the Warsaw Pact. This independence however harmed all Finnish export attempts as the Polish and East German fleets being in firm Novgorodian and Soviet control were designed more around Novgorodian and Soviet practices, and their officers trained in respective naval academies and the chosen naval procurements corresponded to those naval philosophies and were often in odds with Finnish provided solutions.

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